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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONSUMER LAW
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
AUTOMOBILE REPAIR
By far, the number one category of consumer complaints nation-
wide is automobiles and automobile repairs. A survey of 73 state and
local consumer offices by the President's Office of Consumer Affairs
indicated that automobiles were most frequently listed among the top
ten types of consumer complaints received.' The Louisiana Gover-
nor's Office of Consumer Protection also lists automobile repair as the
most frequently complained-of consumer transaction.2 The facts of
West Esplanade Shell Service, Inc. v. Breithoff,3 a Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal decision, highlight the need for reform in the auto-
mobile repair industry. Defendant brought his five-year-old automo-
bile to plaintiff's service station to have it repaired. According to his
version of the facts, defendant was mainly concerned with the auto's
excessive consumption of oil and its emission of smoke. He claimed
that plaintiff had told him that a "valve job" costing about $150
would remedy the oil and smoke problem. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, testified that defendant had requested that a compression test
be performed on the cylinders after bringing his car in for other re-
pairs.' Plaintiff further testified that after performing the requested
compression test he advised defendant that several valves needed
replacing and that in view of the age of the automobile the rings
probably needed replacing also. Plaintiff said that no estimate of the
cost of repairing either the valves or the rings was ever given to
defendant, apparently for the reason that the need for such repairs
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, STATE CONSUMER ACTION, SUMMARY '71 at 11 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office, 1971). Automobiles (new, used, repairs, warranties, etc.) was
listed in the top ten complaint categories by 43 of the 73 reporting offices, while 31
listed deceptive and misleading advertising, and 28 listed credit practices (billing,
collection, and holder-in-due course). The remaining categories were non-delivery of
merchandise (26), magazine and book sales (25), home improvements (22), franchises
and multi-level distributorship plans (22), warranties and guaranties (21) and sales
practices (bait and switch, referral sales, high pressure sales) (17).
2. Internal Research Memorandum of September 12, 1974, Governor's Office of
Consumer Protection (GOCP). Based upon some 6000 complaints received by the
GOCP, the top seven complaint categories and their approximate percentages were:
automobile complaints (18.7); mobile homes (10); mail order (8); home construction
(4.8); apartment and house rental (4.5); credit (3); utilities (2.6).
3. 293 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
4. Defendant and plaintiff were in apparent agreement with respect to other mis-
cellaneous repairs, including certain front-end and air-conditioning work. Id. at 596.
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could not be known prior to removing the cylinder heads, but that
after the cylinder heads were removed, he informed the defendant
that the rings did need replacing. In plaintiff's version, defendant
responded to this information by telling plaintiff to do the valve job
and other unrelated repairs and that he did not want to spend a great
deal of money.
When defendant's auto still emitted smoke after completion of
the valve job, defendant refused to pay plaintiffs bill, and the issue
was framed: what contract existed between the parties? Was it the
understanding of the parties that a valve job be done only if the oil
and smoke problem would thereby be cured? Or did the parties agree
that a valve job be done whether or not the oil and smoke problem
would thereby be cured? Alternatively, did the contract comprehend
the performance by plaintiff of any repairs necessary to cure the
problem? The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling that
the principal cause for authorizing the valve job was the elimination
of oil consumption, and that inasmuch as the valve job did not rem-
edy the problem, the contract was invalidated and plaintiff was not
permitted to recover its expenditure of $71.58.1 Also affirmed by the
court was the ruling below that defendant had failed to offer any
substantiating evidence regarding his reconventional demand for
$1000 for repairing the engine after plaintiff had finished with it and
for $5000 as compensation for pain and anguish.
The facts of the Breithoff case are obviously close, and it's doubt-
ful that any judicial solution in such cases ever yields a satisfactory
result for the parties involved. A requirement of a written estimate
for all repairs over a given amount ($50, for example) with the further
requirements that the actual cost of estimated repairs may not exceed
ten percent of the estimate, and that any additional repairs subse-
quently shown to be necessary or advisable may not be performed
without the subsequently obtained authorization of the owner would
seem a more satisfactory and sensible approach.' In fact, legislation
of a comprehensive nature is called for.!
5. The trial court's ruling was amended so as to allow recovery by plaintiff of
$181.18 for parts and labor in removing the cylinder heads and for the items of repair
not related to the controversy.
6. House Bill No. 1466, introduced in, but not passed by the 1974 Regular Session
of the Louisiana Legislature, would have required that all automobile repair work be
recorded and described on an invoice; a disclosure of any use of used or rebuilt parts;
that upon request by the customer, the automobile repair dealer provide a written
estimate of the price of labor and parts; that the estimate could not exceed $10 or 10%,
whichever is larger, without the oral or written consent of the customer; and that upon
request of the customer, a dealer tender to the customer upon completion of the work,
for customer's inspection, all replaced parts.
7. In addition to House Bill No. 1466, House Bill No. 1206 was introduced but not
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC UTILITY LATE PAYMENT CHARGES
Charges for delinquent, delayed, or late payment have been a
traditional feature of the extension of consumer credit, but perhaps
in no consumer-creditor relationship does the imposition of such
charges rankle the consumer as much as in the symbiotic one between
consumers and the various public utility bodies. Lack of consumer
bargaining power, brought about by the monopolistic legal position
of utilities, driven home by "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts, results in
understandable frustration. While late payment charges imposed in
connection with consumer credit transactions are generally subject to
the disclosure requirements of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
("Truth in Lending")8 and the rate of such charges is regulated by
the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law,' late payment charges by public
utility companies are exempt from those laws"0 and from the Louis-
iana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law." In the
case of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, "[t]ransactions under
public utility tariffs" are expressly exempted from the act's coverage
by section 1603(4) "if the [Federal Reserve] Board determines that
a State regulatory body regulates the charges for the public utility
services involved, the charges for delayed payment, and any discount
allowed for early payment.""
In Grein v. Hawkins,3 defendant's reconventional demand to
plaintiff's suit for sewage services" raised the interesting argument
that since no evidence was introduced by plaintiff that the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System had in fact determined by
positive action that a Louisiana state regulatory body regulates the
charges set forth in section 1603(4), the exemption did not apply.
Defendant did not argue that such charges are unregulated in Louis-
iana, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeal predictably refused to
accept defendant's argument," holding that the utility in question
passed by the 1974 Regular Session. Both bills provide for licensing and regulation of
the motor vehicle repair business. House Concurrent Resolution No. 233 directs the
Commerce Committees to establish a sub-committee to look into automobile repairs
and report back to the 1975 Legislative session.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (1968); 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(b)(4) (1974). But see 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(c) (1974).
9. LA. R.S. 9:3525 (Supp. 1972).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(4) (1968); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(d) (1974); LA. R.S. 9:3512(3)
(Supp. 1972).
11. LA. R.S. 51:1406(1) (Supp. 1972).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(4) (1968) (emphasis added).
13. 295 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
14. See LA. R.S. 45:1203 (Supp. 1960).
15. Even assuming that defendant had successfully attacked the exemption, the
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was in fact regulated by a state regulatory body and was therefore
exempt within the meaning of section 1603(4) of the federal act." The
correctness of the decision is buttressed by the fact that the Board
has ruled in Regulation Z" §226.3(d), that public utility transactions
are exempt if the charges mentioned in section 1603(4) "are filed
with, reviewed by, or regulated by an agency of the Federal Govern-
ment, a State, or a political subdivision thereof,'" The Board has,
in addition, made no "determinations" under section 1603(4) and
has, in fact, granted no exemptions to any particular utility.
The Louisiana Consumer Credit Law provides an exemption for
public utility transactions" which is patterned upon section 226.3(d)
of Regulation Z, while the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law is expressly inapplicable to "[a]ctions or
transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Ser-
vice Commission or other public utility regulatory body."2 Conced-
ing that the two Louisiana Acts are inapplicable to public utility
transactions, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in State v. Council
of City of New Orleans2' has ruled that public utility late charges
nevertheless may be in violation of Civil Code article 2924. Both the
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI) and the Louisiana Power
and Light Company (LP&L)22 operate pursuant to a rate schedule
which provides that the customer's net monthly bill (calculated in
accordance with the applicable rate) "will be increased ten percent
if payment is not made on or before the due date shown on the bill,
which shall not be less than 10 days after it is rendered." 2 The Attor-
ney General, acting as a representative of the Louisiana consumer
public at large and on behalf of state agencies located in the City of
New Orleans consuming gas and electricity, challenged the ten per-
federal Truth-in-Lending law would not necessarily have been violated. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.2(k), .2(m), .4(c) (1974).
16. See also Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1972-1973 Term - Consumer Law, 34 LA. L. REv. 326 n.2.
18. 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(d) (1974). The importance of Board regulations has been
greatly enhanced by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
19. LA. R.S. 9:3512(3) (Supp. 1972).
20. LA. R.S. 51:1406(1) (Supp. 1972).
21. 297 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
22. NOPSI provides gas and electric services to all but the Fifth Municipal Dis-
trict in the City of New Orleans. LP&L, an intervenor in the case, provides service for
the Fifth Municipal District. The billing and collection practices of LP&L and NOPSI
are the same. Id. at 519.
23. Id. at 519-20.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cent increase as violative of article 2924 in an action24 filed against
NOPSI and the Council of the City of New Orleans. The district court
dismissed the suit, concluding that the ten percent late payment
charge was a vital part of the basic rate-making structure and not
"interest as damages for non-payment of money." On the contrary,
the trial court determined that the charge was designed to allocate
the cost of late payment of utility bills to the customers responsible,
and that the charge was a practical method of preventing discrimina-
tion among the utility's customers.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's
decision and has thereby set the stage for what may be the most far-
reaching consumer law decision to date by the Louisiana supreme
court. The substance of NOPSI's argument is that the late charge is
a rate differential used to offset expenses attributable to delayed,
delinquent and uncollectible accounts, and charged to those custom-
ers responsible for such expenses. In addition, NOPSI views the late
charge as an inducement to customers to pay their bills promptly.
The Fourth Circuit, however, viewed the charge to late paying cus-
tomers as a discriminatory underwriting by those customers of the
expenses caused by other customers who never pay (uncollectible
accounts) and still others whose service is reconnected following a
disconnection for non-payment. Since the court found no relationship
between the expenses incident to the two classes of customers, it
concluded that the late charges constitute unjust discrimination, and
held them not to be a "utility rate."
The court also disposed of NOPSI's argument that the late
charge is a permissible "time-price differential," by holding the
charge to be a penalty for failure to pay at a designated time and
"interest" as defined in Civil Code article 1935.25 Thus, the ten per-
cent rate violated the eight percent limit for conventional interest
allowed by Civil Code article 2924.26
FINANCE CHARGES
Lender credit cards 7 are perhaps the latest step in an evolution-
24. The Attorney General additionally, but unsuccessfully, alleged that NOPSI
and the Council were in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protec-
tion Law, LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972).
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1935 defines interest as: "The damages due for delay in the
performance of an obligation to pay money are called interest. The creditor is entitled
to these damages without proving any loss, and whatever loss he may have suffered
he can recover no more."
26. Cf. Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1974)
(public utilities late charge did not violate Tennessee usury law).
27. Defined by the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law as "an arrangement or loan
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ary process seemingly headed toward a "cashless" society.2" The
process began in the 1940's with the increasing acceptance by both
consumers and retailers of the charge card or charge plate, and con-
tinued into the 1950's and 1960's with the mass mailing of largely
unsolicited oil company credit cards." The major areas of controversy
surrounding the use of credit cards have been: liability of the con-
sumer for unauthorized use" of both solicited and unsolicited cards,
the legality of monthly finance charges (typically 11/2% per month)
under local usury laws,3 use of the "previous balance" method" in
applying the monthly finance charge, and the imposition of interest
on interest.3 3 In Louisiana, while the problems of liability, permissible
monthly charges, and of the use of the previous balance method have
been resolvad by a combination of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act 34 and the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law,35 the issue of interest
on interest seems unresolved at this point.
Incident to the enactment of the Louisiana Consumer Credit
agreement. . .pursuant to which a lender gives a consumer the privilege of using a
credit card, letter of credit or other credit confirmation or identification in transactions
out of which debt arises, (a) by the lender's payment or agreement to pay the con-
sumer's obligations; or, (b) by the lender's purchase from the obligee of the consumer's
obligations." LA. R.S. 9:3516(18) (Supp. 1972). "Mastercharge" and "BankAmeri-
card" cards are examples. Use of lender credit cards results in a revolving loan account.
Use of seller credit cards (department stores, oil companies) results in a revolving
charge account. See LA. R.S. 9:3516(25) (Supp. 1972).
28. See Bergsten, Credit Cards -- A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REv. 485 (1967).
29. By 1967, one estimate put at 200,000,000 the number of credit cards in use.
Note,77 YALE L.J. 1418 (1968).
30. Card issuers initially attempted to expressly place liability on the card user
for all purchases by anyone until surrender to the issuer of the card. See Magnolia Pet.
Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
31. See State v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973).
32. The assessment of the finance charge on the balance of the account as of the
beginning of the billing period, as opposed to the actual unpaid balance at the time
that the charge is imposed.
33. Compounding of the finance charge results when the finance charge for a given
billing period is assessed on an unpaid account balance which includes previously
imposed but unpaid finance charges.
34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1642-44 (1970) (liability of cardholders).
35. LA. R.S. 9:3524 (Supp. 1972) authorized the imposition of a loan finance
charge on a lender credit card revolving loan account of 1 /2 % per month, which charge
may be assessed on the balance of the account on the first day of each billing period
without regard to transactions affecting the account during the billing period. Similar
provisions are set out with respect to seller credit card revolving charge accounts under
LA. R.S. 9:3523 (Supp. 1972). Both sections also permitted use of the "average daily
unpaid balance of the account" method of assessing the finance charge. But see notes
38-39 infra.
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Law, article 1939 of the Civil Code was amended and re-enacted so
as to state: "except as provided by the Louisiana Consumer Credit
Law, interest upon interest cannot be recovered unless it be added
to the principal, and by another contract made a new debt. '36 Be-
cause the "balance of the account on the first day of each billing
period"37 can be construed to mean "balance of unpaid principal and
accrued finance charges from previous billing periods," it is arguable
that the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law authorized both the "pre-
vious balance" method of computation 6 and the imposition of inter-
est on interest. In any event, the Consumer Credit Protection Act
would require disclosures pertinent to the finance charge and the
annual percentage rate" upon which a consumer-user could base a
cause of action pertaining to the assessment of the monthly charge.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in First National
Bank of Commerce v. Eaves" may hasten a decision on these issues.
Defendant in Eaves, upon being sued for the balance owing on
his BankAmericard account,42 reconvened on the basis of plaintiff's
charging interest upon interest. From the dismissal of the reconven-
tional demand on exceptions of no right and no cause of action," he
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1939.
37. LA. R.S. 9:3523-24 (Supp. 1972).
38. Section 3523 of the Consumer Credit Law states with respect to the balance
of a revolving charge account only that it is not to regard "transactions affecting the
account during the billing period." By constrast, section 3524 states that "the face
amount of the checks. . .or similar written instruments received by the extender of
credit in connection with the revolving loan or the amounts actually paid pursuant to
the consumer's direction to pay, less the amount applicable to principal from time to
time paid thereon by the consumer, shall be the unpaid balance of the debt upon which
said loan finance charge shall be computed." LA. R.S. 9:3523-24 (Supp. 1972) (empha-
sis added).
Section 3524 was amended during the 1974 Session of the Louisiana Legislature,
and effective January 1, 1975, loan finance charges may be computed only on the
average daily balance of the account during the billing period or other method not
yielding a charge greater than that method. La. Acts 1974, No. 466 § 1. Section 3523
was not similarly amended. See La. H.B. 1375, Reg. Sess. 1974.
39. Since R.S. 9:3524 gave the extender of credit the alternative to apply the 1/2%
per month to the "average daily unpaid balance of the principal of the debt during
the billing period," the wording of the alternative suggests that interest on interest is
permissible with respect to the "first day balance" method. R.S. 9:3523 speaks of the
"balance of the account" with respect to both the alternative methods it sets up.
As amended, section 3524 permits the computation in accordance with the average
daily unpaid balance of the principal of the debt during the billing period. LA. R.S.
9:3524, as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 466 § 1.
40. 12 C.F.R. § 226.7 (1974).
41. 282 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
42. Id. at 742. Plaintiff also sought attorney's fees.
43. Id. at 745.
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took appeal to the Fourth Circuit. In reversing the lower court's
ruling, the court of appeal concluded that defendant's demand in
reconvention stated a cause of action and that federal usury law"
does not provide an exclusive remedy as to national banks. 5 In the
view of the Fourth Circuit, among the theoretical causes of action
stated by defendant's "interest on interest" allegations were: the fed-
eral usury law,"6 the federal Truth in Lending law,47 and article 2924
of the Civil Code. 48
In Berry v. Thompson,41 a landlord had leased to the tenant a
dwelling for the term of one year at a rental of $150, payable monthly
in advance. Tenant vacated the premises after eight months, com-
plaining of problems regarding the sewer system. Landlord exercised
an acceleration clause" in the lease and filed suit for $600 rent re-
maining for the term which was met by tenant's reconventional de-
mand seeking damages for failure to make disclosures required by
section 1640 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("Truth in Lend-
ing").51 The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held, however, that such
a real estate lease is not a "consumer credit"52 transaction within the
coverage of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 3
Because the main thrust of the disclosures required by the
federal law pertains to the cost of sale or loan credit expressed in
terms of a finance charge and an annual percentage rate,54 and such
disclosures would have little meaning in most dwelling lease trans-
actions involving no finance charge, one can easily agree with the
court's ruling. However, the issue raised in Berry, as is so often the
case in situations involving the scope of the federal act, has a superfi-
cial simplicity which may be shown by closer examination to be de-
ceptive. The act does not, for example, expressly exempt consumer
dwelling lease transactions from coverage;55 nor are such transactions
44. Plaintiff relied upon 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1970).
45. 282 So. 2d at 745. Cf. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 309 F.
Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1970).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)-(e) (1970).
48. The operative facts of the case apparently pre-date the Louisiana Consumer
Credit Law, LA. R.S. 9:3510-68 (Supp. 1972).
49. 297 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
50. The clause provided that if the tenant failed to pay any one month's rent when
due, all the unmatured rent became due and exigible, at landlord's option. 297 So. 2d
at 485.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
52. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1974).
53. 297 So. 2d at 486.
54. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(e), .2(q), .4,.5,.6,.7,.8 (1974).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (1974).
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definitionally excludable either. "Consumer credit" is broadly de-
fined under the act as the right granted by a creditor (a person who
in the ordinary course of business regularly extends or offers to extend
consumer credit) to a natural person to incur debt and defer its pay-
ment, where the money, property, or service which is the subject of
the transaction is primarily for personal, family, household or agricul-
tural purposes and for which either a finance charge is imposed or
which, pursuant to an agreement is or may be repayable in more than
four installments."5 The lease in Berry conceivably can be viewed
from the standpoint of the federal act as an $1800 debt incurred by
the consumer, the repayment of which is deferred over the one-year
term by twelve equal monthly installment payments of $150 subject
to an acceleration clause. So viewed, the act's disclosure require-
ments would be triggered, and given a failure to make the required
disclosures, the consumer would be entitled to a recovery under sec-
tion 1640 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of $100, costs, and
attorney's fees. 5
CONSUMERS AND THE RECALCITRANT LANDLORD
In 1972 the Louisiana Legislature enacted much-needed reform
legislation regulating the landlord-tenant relationship"8 by requiring
the return of tenant deposits or advances within one month of termi-
nation of the lease." Under R.S. 9:3251 a landlord may retain all or
any portion of a deposit or advance to remedy a default by a tenant,
or to remedy unreasonable wear to the premises attributable to the
56. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(k), (1), (m) (1974).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970). Opinion letters by two Federal Reserve Board attor-
neys take the view that the typical apartment lease arrangement was not intended by
Congress to be brought within the sweep of "consumer credit" transactions unless the
lease is open-end, with an option to buy on the part of the lessee for nominal considera-
tion (i.e., a "credit sale" under 12 C.F.R. § 226.2). See FRB Letter of July 31, 1973,
by Griffith L. Garwood in 4 CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 30,998 (Automobile Closed End
Lease Arrangements); FRB Letter of Aug. 23, 1973, by Jerauld C. Kluckman in 4 CCH
Cons. Cred. Guide 31,021 (Apartment or Hotel Rental Agreement). On the other
hand, Mr. Garwood has subsequently expressed concern on behalf on the Federal
Reserve Board "that the rapidly expanding area of consumer leasing may represent a
major potential loophole in Truth in Lending." FRB Letter of Sept. 12, 1973, by
Griffith L. Garwood in 4 CCH CoNs. CRED. GUIDE 31,029. The fact that consumer
dwelling leases may not come within the definition of a "credit sale" under Reg. Z
§ 226.2(n) (12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (1974)] does not mean that "consumer credit" has not
been extended under 3H 226.2(k), (1), and (m), calling for the disclosures set forth in
§§ 226.8(b), (d). Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
58. See note 2 supra.
59. LA. R.S. 9:3251-54 (Supp. 1972).
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occupancy of the tenant;60 but retention of any portion of the deposit
or advance triggers a'requirement that the landlord forward to the
tenant within one month of the termination date an itemized state-
ment accounting for and giving reasons for his action.6"
The traditional problem with respect to return of tenant deposits
or advances has been the unequal bargaining position of the tenant
- recovery from recalcitrant landlords or their agents often required
the assistance of an attorney, whose best advice would be that pursuit
of the matter was not economically feasible.2 To remedy this inequal-
ity of bargaining power, and to provide a meaningful enforcement of
the requirements pertaining to the itemized accounting and state-
ment of reasons for the retention of a deposit or advance, the Legisla-
ture provided that any purported waiver by the tenant of rights under
the act is null and void, 3 that a willful failure by the landlord to
comply with section 3251 gives the tenant the right to recover from
the landlord actual damages or $200, whichever is greater, and that
costs and attorney's fees may in the court's discretion be awarded to
a prevailing tenant in a "willful failure" case." The statute also sets
up as one category of "willful failure" the refusal to remit within
thirty days after written demand for a refund. 5
Though the tenant deposit statute is perhaps an improvement
over prior law, some potentially difficult issues remain,"6 as illus-
60. LA. R.S. 9:3251 (Supp. 1972). A recent opinion of the Louisiana Attorney
General indicates that cleaning, mopping, waxing and related activities do not consti-
tute remedying "unreasonable wear" of the premises and that the landlord therefore
may not deduct his cleaning costs from the tenant's deposit on that basis. However,
the opinion did say that such costs may be deducted if the lease specifically imposes
on the tenant the obligation to clean the premises and, under LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2719
and 2720, if the premises were in a clean condition when turned over to the tenant at
the beginning of the lease. 1974 LA. Op. Anry. GEN. No. 75-35 (Dec. 16, 1974).
61. Id. The section contains dual requirements: itemized accounting and a state-
ment of reasons. Specificity would seem to be the statutory norm, so that a statement
advising the tenant that "$30 of his deposit was retained to cover the cost of carpet
cleaning" would be incomplete under section 3251 unless accompanied by a statement
supportive of the need for such maintenance from the standpoint of" unreasonable
wear," as opposed, for example, to normal maintenance.
62. See Cantelli v. Tonti, 297 So. 2d 766, 769 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
63. LA. R.S. 9:3254 (SuwP. 1972).
64. A prevailing landlord in such a case is similarly eligible for an award of costs
and attorney's fees. LA. R.S. 9:3253 (Supp. 1972).
65. LA. R.S. 9:3253 (Supp. 1972).
66. E.g., Termination (and notice thereof by tenant) vs. automatic lease renewal
provisions; accounting of "remedied" defaults other than in rent payments; the "un-
reasonable wear" loophole; the requisite specificity of the landlord's reasons for reten-
tion; the possibility of showing a "willful failure" beyond a refusal to remit upon
written demand for refund.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
trated by Moore v. Drexel Homes, Inc. 7 The lease provided that a
failure to give notice5 of termination at least thirty days prior to the
expiration of term resulted in an automatic renewal of the lease.
Tenant testified that he mailed a notice in a timely fashion, but
landlord disputed receipt thereof." Subsequent to vacating the prem-
ises, tenant made repeated written demands on landlord for return
of his deposit of $100. Landlord at no time replied, remitted, or for-
warded to tenant an itemized accounting, presumably in reliance on
the renewal provision. But landlord's testimony regarding non-
receipt of tenant's notice was found wanting by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal, the court concluding that tenant's notice was effec-
tive70 and that landlord's failure to return the deposit upon tenant's
demand, or alternatively, to comply with section 3251 was a "willful"
failure under 3252. Tenant was granted a judgment for $200 and
awarded $300 as attorney's fees under section 3253, upon the premise
that landlord had ignored his repeated demands for return of deposit
or an accounting, leaving tenant no recourse but to file suit.
In Bradwell v. Carter,' landlord and tenant had a bona fide
dispute as to the responsibility for certain repairs, the cost of which
tenant had deducted from her rental payment." Landlord thereafter
demanded the full rent, but gave tenant the option to vacate without
complying with the notice provisions of the lease - an option tenant
exercised forthwith. Some four months later tenant demanded return
of her $50 deposit. Landlord neither returned the deposit nor com-
plied with the requirements of section 3251. The trial court ordered
return of the deposit and awarded attorney's fees, but denied dam-,
ages on the basis that the bona fide dispute rendered landlord's fail-
ure to remit not willful. The First Circuit Court of Appeal, correctly
categorizing the repairs dispute as irrelevant, amended the trial
court's judgment so as to award tenant an additional $200, making
the following observations:
67. 293 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
68. The expiration date of the lease was January 31, 1971. Tenant's notice was
allegedly sent on December 26, 1970, but rather than stating his intent to terminate
as of February 1, 1971, tenant advised landlord of his intent to move into a home on
or before June 1, 1971 and that he "would like to continue to rent...on a month to
month basis until such time." Tenant did not actually vacate the apartment until July
31, 1972, after mailing to landlord a notice of such intent on June 22, 1972.
69. Tenant's rent check, which allegedly was mailed with the disputed notice, was
received by the landlord. 293 So. 2d at 501-02.
70. See note 68 supra.
71. 299 So. 2d 853 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
72. Id. The dispute involved the sum of $15.
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We can see no reason why the statute should not be enforced
according to its terms, which are clear and unambiguous. We
think that the Legislature intended by this statute to require
landlords to remit or account for rental deposits as required by
the act, or to suffer the penalties therein provided."
The Bradwell and Moore cases clearly demonstrate that the Les-
see Deposit Act is working as intended by the Legislature, and if the
example set by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Cantelli v.
Tont' with respect to the award of attorney's fees is followed by
other courts in Louisiana, the act will indeed be effective. The land-
lord in Cantelli failed to either remit the tenants' deposit of $150 or
give a reason for its retention within thirty days of the first of tenants'
two written demands," but as in Bradwell, the trial court had granted
judgment only for the deposit, with no award under the willful failure
provision of section 3252 of the act. The Fourth Circuit, however, held
the landlord's failure to comply with section 3251 as willful,"6 and
amended the award by granting tenants, in addition to the return of
their $150 deposit, an award of $200, together with attorney's fees in
the amount of $750. 77
CONSUMERS AND THE RECALCITRANT MERCHANT
The court of appeal decisions in Axelrod v. Wardrobe Cleaners,
Inc.,78 Leatherman v. Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co.," and
Thomas v. House of Toyota" exemplify two important points of con-
sumer law. First, some merchants often attempt to disclaim liability
for loss or damages to goods entrusted to their care by consumers.8
All too often the result is that consumers who have claims to press in
various situations are confronted with a curious phenomenon: a circle
of would-be responsible parties, each of whom is pointing to the per-
73. Id. at 854.
74. 297 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
75. Id. at 769.
76. "Defendant made no attempt to justify its failure to return the security de-
posit. . . . Astonishingly, the defendants offered no evidence whatever, testimonial or
documentary, in support of their position." Id.
77. In awarding attorney's fees, the court considered the time involved in original
consultation and research preparatory to filing suit, drafting of the pleadings, pretrial
preparation and interviews, two court appearances, preparation of appellate briefs,
and argument before the court of appeal. 297 So. 2d at 769, 770.
78. 289 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
79. 297 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
80. 286 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
81. The disclaimer often takes the form of a sign proclaiming "not responsible for
loss or damage due to fire, theft or accident."
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son on his left as the guilty party. Second, resort by consumers to
litigation in such situations, unfortunate as the necessity of it may
be, can be and usually is successful. In the Axelrod case, for example,
an award of $1000 to the consumer as replacement value for draperies
ruined" during the process of dry-cleaning by defendant was affirmed
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Defendant pointed out that
inferior fabric dye, rather than the cleaning process itself, could have
caused the damage, and that with new imported fabrics it is difficult
to predict how the dyes will react to the cleaning process. 3 Defendant
also offered evidence that pre-testing for colorfastness is impractical
since an unsuccessful test would damage the area of the fabric tested.
But since defendant's agent had inspected the drapes and (impliedly)
satisfied himself that they would withstand dry-cleaning, defendant's
unconditional acceptance of them was an implied assurance to the
plaintiff that the drapes could withstand the process, and the rela-
tionship of bailment for hire was created, imposing upon defendant
the duty under Civil Code article 2937 of diligent care of a prudent
administrator.
The facts in the Leatherman case were likewise undisputed.
Plaintiff left his automobile at the business premises of defendant's
insured, where it was irretrievably stolen from inside a locked build-
ing. The break-in was apparently describable only as "effortless." 4
An unopened safe secured the keys to all customer automobiles ex-
cept plaintiff's, 5 whose auto was the only one stolen. Citing the deci-
sion of the Louisiana supreme court in Coe Oil Service, Inc. v. Hair,"8
a factually similar case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
the ruling of the trial court that defendant's insured failed to meet
the standard of care of a prudent administrator to preserve the plain-
tiff's property as required of a compensated depositary under articles
2937 and 2938.
Similar to the decisions of Axelrod and Leatherman are the First
Circuit Court of Appeal decisions in Landry v. State Farm Mutual
82. Defendant did not deny that the drapes were damaged while in its custody.
83. Axelrod v. Wardrobe Cleaners, Inc., 289 So. 2d 847, 849 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974).
84. Entry was gained through unsecured glass pane windows in the rear of the
building, and the plaintiff's automobile driven out through sliding doors after breaking
an inside lock. Leatherman v. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 297 So. 2d 541, 542 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974).
85. Plaintiff's keys were apparently left unprotected by an employee working late,
presumably on plaintiff's automobile.
86. 283 So. 2d 734 (La. 1973).
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Automobile Insurance Co. 7 and Thomas v. House of Toyota.8 In
Toyota, defendant automobile dealer, acting as an agent of the defen-
dant insurance agency collected from plaintiff as an incident to the
sale to plaintiff of a used automobile, the sum of $203 for the purpose
of obtaining collision insurance for the vehicle." The automobile was
purchased for the use of plaintiff's son, a person under 21 years of age.
For reasons not convincingly explained by the defendants and no
doubt best known to them, collision insurance coverage was obtained
for plaintiff only, at a cost of $122, which coverage was subsequently
cancelled by the insurers for the reason that plaintiff's son was shown
to be the principal driver of the vehicle." Defendant insurance agency
advised plaintiffs son of the reason for the cancellation, but whether
the impression was left with plaintiffs son that the agency would
contact him later about further coverage was a disputed matter. Nei-
ther plaintiff nor his son, however, demanded a return of premium
or an explanation of the $203 paid. Thereafter the subject automobile
was involved in an accident and damaged to the extent of $882.95.
No collision coverage was then in force. The First Circuit affirmed the
lower court's judgment in favor of plaintiff" in the amount of
$590.03,11 classifying both defendants as brokers93 owing a fiduciary
responsibility to the insured as well as to the insurer. The obligation
was breached by the failure of the defendants to investigate the dis-
crepancy in the amount received from plaintiff and the amount ac-
tually paid for the coverage, and the type of coverage actually pro-
vided.
The insurer in Landry refused to make medical payments to its
insured who was injured while operating a truck which was struck by
another vehicle. The same policy language 4 had earlier been inter-
87. 298 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
88. 286 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
89. Both the chattel mortgage and the purchase order reflected that the $203
amount was to be used to purchase the collision insurance. The figure of $203 was
obtained from the defendant insurance agency at the request of Toyota.
90. From the viewpoint of the insurer, the sum of $122 would not provide coverage
for plaintiff and an under-age principal driver; however, it was apparently undisputed
that the sum of $203 was sufficient to provide the requested coverage.
91. Judgment was entered by the Baton Rouge City Court against both defen-
dants, in solido, but only the defendant insurance agency appealed.
92. Defendant was held entitled to credits of $100 (the "deductible" portion of the
policy) and $192.92, an amount returned to plaintiff prior to trial.
93. Toyota had received a commission in connection with the insurance portion
of the transaction.
94. Medical payments were to be made under the policy "to... the named insu-
red... who sustains bodily injury... caused by accident (a) while occupying the
owned automobile, (b) while occupying a non-owned automobile. . . or (c) through
being struck by an automobile or by a trailer of any type ... " Landry v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 291, 292-93 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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preted by the First Circuit Court of Appeal as providing coverage
under similar circumstances," and for that reason the court held the
failure to pay medical benefits under the policy was arbitrary and
capricious. Noting that "the insurer not only misinterpreted the pro-
visions of its own policy but also ignored judicial interpretation
thereof," the court awarded plaintiff-insured a statutory penalty of
12% of his medical expenses recovery plus attorney's fees of $750
under R.S. 22:658. Landry illustrates the potential therapeutic effect
of statutes such as R.S. 22:658, and the legislature should consider
enacting such statutes applicable to the numerous transactions and
situations involving consumers and recalcitrant merchants and busi-
ness entities.
TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held in Faris v. Model's
Guild" that the failure of defendant modeling school to be licensed
under the Proprietary Schools Act 7 left it without authority to engage
in the business of a "proprietary school," rendering its contract with
plaintiff unenforceable. Apparently on the basis of defendant's legal
incapacity, plaintiff also sought treble damages and attorney's fees
under section 1409 of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Law. 8 The affirmance by the court of the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs action aptly demonstrates the hur-
dles confronting the consumer under section 1409: treble damages
and attorney's fees are based upon proof of actual damages sustained,
always a difficult problem of proof. An award of treble damages car-
ries the additional prerequisite of proof that the defendant knowingly
used an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice after being "put
on notice" by the director of the Consumer Protection Division or by
the Attorney General." There was apparently neither a showing in
Faris that actual damages were sustained nor that defendant was
95. In Blanchard v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), the
court had held, contrary to defendant's argument in Landry, that the language of
subsection "c" contemplated coverage in the situation where an insured is not occupy-
ing the vehicle but is physically outside the vehicle.
96. 297 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
97. LA. R.S. 17:3141.1-.14 (Supp. 1972). Perhaps due to its violation, defendant
failed to grant plaintiff's request that her attorney review defendant's documents prior
to signing. 297 So. 2d at 537.
98. LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972).
99. LA. R.S. 51:1409(A) (Supp. 1972). See Symposium: Louisiana's New Con-
sumer Protection Legislation, 34 LA. L. REv. 597, 645-47 (1974).
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"put on notice."'' 0 The Faris case must be viewed in part as a failure
by plaintiff to prove actual damages, for it is clear that actual dam-
ages can be shown in such cases. 0'
An additional aspect of Faris is germane within the context of
the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Defen-
dant's unauthorized conduct of business as a proprietary school was
in itself arguably a deceptive act or practice under the Louisiana
act, ' 2 and the fact that some question was raised as to whether any
of its "graduates" were being employed"0 3 as models makes the case
stronger, even though defendant expressly disclaimed any guarantee
of placement. 04 Such a conclusion is, under the purposes and intent
of the law, the same, despite the fact that defendant's acts may not
have constituted "fraud.' 0
5
CONSUMER PRIVACY
Defendant in Fassitt v. United T. V. Rental, Inc.'"' rented to
plaintiffs a stereo phonograph at a cost of $7.35 per week. While
defendant's radio advertising stated that "all the rent money you pay
100. Subsequent to the transaction in question defendant had entered into an
Assurance of Voluntary Compliance under the provisions of section 1410 of the Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and as the Fourth Circuit pointed out,
such an action "shall not be considered an admission of violation for any purpose"
under LA. R.S. 51:1410 (Supp. 1972). 297 So. 2d at 540.
101. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934). Cf. National Dynamics
Corp. v. John Surrey, Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); French Art Cleaners v.
State Board of Dry Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 459, 254 P.2d 42 (Cal. 1953). See also Rice,
Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and The Duality of Consumer Transaction
Problems, 48 Bos. U.L. REV. 559, 561-63 (1965).
102. See Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957) (falsely representing
approval of Veterans Administration); Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) (use
of words "Institute" or "Univeristy" held deceptive and an unfair method of competi-
tion where a "school" had no diploma or degree recognized by any governmental
agency or any reputable college or university). Cf. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374 (1965) (deceptive practice to falsely state that products have been "certi-
fied"); Tractor Training Service v. FTC, 227 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1955).
103. 297 So. 2d at 537.
104. Id. at 540.
105. Id. The Louisiana statute is based on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970), and FTC case law is to be viewed as "authorita-
tive" in questions of interpretation and construction. See Symposium: Louisiana's
New Consumer Protection Legislation, 34 LA. L. REV. 597, 636 n.15. Under FTC juris-
prudence intent to deceive is not a necessary ingredient for a "deceptive" act or
practice. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957);
Sebrone Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1943).
106. 297 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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goes toward the purchase price"'' 7 of the item rented, and in general
gave the impression that title to the item would automatically be
transferred after renting it for fifteen months, defendant's written
contract, signed by plaintiffs, in fact gave them an option to purchase
only for thirty days, and then only by a registered mail notice and
payment of the balance of the suggested retail price, plus interest and
taxes, in cash. Not only did plaintiffs fail to exercise the option in a
timely manner, but their weekly rental charges were not timely made
either, and pursuant to a clause in the contract purportedly so au-
thorizing,0 8 defendant's agents peaceably entered plaintiffs' home
and repossessed the phonograph. No judicial process was utilized and
the consent of neither of the plaintiffs was obtained for the entry. In
affirming the trial judge's award of $500 as damages for "a technical
tort committed to their sort of family relationship, [i.e.] the
household in general. .. 10 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held
that defendant's attempted contractual waiver of plaintiffs' right to
privacy in their home was insufficient to legitimate what otherwise
would be an illegal entry into plaintiffs' home:
Public policy cannot condone the use in a sale or lease con-
tract of a provision irrevocably authorizing entry into a debtor's
or lessee's home without judicial authority or without the owner's
consent at the time of entry. We decline to construe the quoted
provision, incorporated into a printed form contract as a neces-
sary condition of the agreement, as irrevocable permission to
enter a private home at any time, day or night, occupied or unoc-
cupied, under any circumstances. Law and order cannot allow
such a construction, which would tend to encourage breaches of
the peace." 0
The alternative grounds available to consumers in such cases
merit mention. The rental of household goods with an option to apply
payments to the purchase price is essentially a consumer credit trans-
action"' and thus consideration of the Federal Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act becomes germane."' Additionally, such a purported
107. Id. at 286.
108. Id.
109. 297 So. 2d at 287.
110. Id. Cf. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Len-
nox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
111. The nature of the contract was recognized by the court when it stated, "To
a person in so low an economic status that he had to obtain ownership of a phonograph
by a transaction with no down payment and small weekly installments collected at his
door, the contractual option was really an illusory right." 297 So. 2d at 286.
112. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. See also FRB Letters in 4 CCH
[Vol. 35
1975] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1973-1974 401
waiver of the right of privacy may violate the unconscionability provi-
sions of section 3551"1 of the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, as a
clause "so onerous, oppressive or one-sided that a reasonable man
would not have freely given his consent [thereto]." '" Finally, and to
the extent defendant's advertising was calculated to give the erro-
neous and misleading impression that all rental payments applied to
the purchase price, or that title to the item automatically transferred
to renters, defendant arguably employed an "unfair or deceptive act
or practice" in violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law," 5 not to mention the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act." 6
CONS. CRED. GUIDE I 30,039, 30,117, 30,597, 31,069 (rental-purchase agreements as
"credit sales"). Cf. FRB Letter at 31,083. In its Annual Report to Congress on Truth
in Lending for 1973, the Federal Reserve Board recommended that Congress look into
the matter of consumer leases with options to purchase such goods as television sets,
to the end of including such transactions in the disclosure requirements of the Truth
in Lending Act. FRB Opinion letters notwithstanding, the transaction in Fassett argu-
ably is within the scope of the federal law anyway, since it involved a finance charge
which "is or may be imposed" under § 226.2(k) of Regulation Z [12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k)
(1974)].
113. LA. R.S. 9:3551 (Supp. 1972). Cf. Kosches v. Nichols, 4 CCH CoNs. CRED.
GUIDE 99,186 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) (clause giving seller right to enter debtor's residence
and seize goods without court order held unconscionable).
114. LA. R.S. 9:3516(29) (Supp. 1972).
115. LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
